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THE GAME THEORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
VERSUS THE PAX ROMANA
Uri Weiss1 and Joseph Agassi2

Game theorists recommend the strategy of the Pax Romana: if you
want peace, prepare for war. It is conditional aggressiveness. The better alternative is the conditional generosity that the European Union
(EU) practices with great success.
These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to
punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the best response to the strategy of “always cooperate” is to always defect. Yet, these strategies may belong
to the game known as the stag hunt. In it, the best response to the
strategy of “always cooperate” is cooperating with the other player
through each round of the game. The game played by the European
Union, we contend, is nearer to the stag hunt game than to the prisoner’s dilemma game. Every European Union country recently
(rightly, of course) recognizes peace as best—and thus as better than
an attack on a defenseless neighbor that would lead to an immediate
victory.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA VERSUS
STAG HUNT

THE

Below is a diagram of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Consider two
people detained for possession of illegal weapons near a bank in
which an armed robbery just took place. The police have strong
enough evidence to stick both with a lenient penalty, but not enough
evidence to stick both with a severe penalty; so, the police encourage
each of them to testify against the other. To achieve that, the police
isolate them and propose to each of them individual plea-bargains.
The options that the game offers are the following: if they both defect,
they will both receive a medium penalty; if they cooperate with each
1. Uri Weiss, a Polonsky Fellow at Van Leer Jerusalem Institute.
2. Joseph Agassi, Tel Aviv University, York University, Toronto and L’Università degli Studi
“Gabriele D’Annunzio”, Chieti-Pescara, Italia.
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other and keep silent, they will both receive a lenient penalty. There
are four possible results:
Coop
Def

Coop
2, 2
1, 4

Def
4, 1
3, 3

Figure 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma
Thus, the wish to maximize individual benefit imposes on each player
in the prisoner’s dilemma the temptation to betray the other, regardless of the other’s strategy.3 The strategy described here is not the only
one available; it is dominant in the sense that in all permissible situations, a player will gain more than from any alternative strategy.
Therefore, in this game, a player cannot gain anything from learning
information about the strategy of the opponent.4 Hence, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, rationality precludes the socially optimal result:
it leads to the most socially dissatisfying result.5 This is intriguing. The
unpleasant aspect of the situation of the prisoner’s dilemma—the distrust inherent in it—is irreparable, since it prescribes a result that cannot be improved by soliciting trust.6
Some similar games allow for improvements of outcomes through
gaining the trust of other players. The most common illustration of
this is the variant of the prisoner’s dilemma game known as the “staghunt game.”7 Interestingly, many variants of this game exist; a little
3. This idea of strategy is as old as game theory. According to the definition of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), a strategy is a player’s plan that prescribes choices for every possible
situation given every possible set of relevant information. Thus, a strategy is a comprehensive
policy, a plan for action in every possible situation that the rules of the game permit. Obviously,
then, the project of von Neumann and Morgenstern is utopian. As Kenneth Arrow has noted,
such a strategy is impossible even for chess, that poses problem-situations much simpler than
most real-life ones. The limitation of Von Neumann and Morgenstern study to games with fully
determined result limits severely the intellectual challenge of their theory. Surprisingly, the theory is nevertheless somewhat challenging. The standard examples for this are the strategies in
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma of always defect and the tit-for-tat. JOHN VON NEUMANN &
OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 49 (1944).
4. This is equivalent to what in the early stages of game theory was called “the sure thing
strategy” and that Savage called “the sure-thing principle.” LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATION OF STATISTICS 21 (2d ed. 1972).
5. See, e.g., Robert J. Aumann, Game Engineering, in MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING AND
GAME THEORY FOR DECISION MAKING (S. K. Neogy et al. eds., 2008). See Steven Kuhn, Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2019), available at https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2019/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
6. This may explain the futility in some situations of the goodwill of peace activists who do not
try to act politically in order to change the rules of the game.
7. This game was proposed by Rousseau in a less precise language than is common in game
theory:
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change in the game may lead to very different results.8 In it, cooperation produces the optimal payoff for all players; the unilateral betrayal
of one gives the defector the second-best payoff, and to the other
player, the worst payoff. Mutual betrayal gives both individuals the
third-best payoff. For this stag hunt game, again, there are four possible outcomes. The stag-hunt game is best illustrated by two hunters
who choose simultaneously whether to hunt a stag or rabbits.9 If both
hunters go for a stag, they succeed and each gains a part of the stag,
which is the best result. On the other hand, a player who goes for a
stag alone meets with an absolute failure, which is the worst result. A
player who goes for the rabbits alone wins all the rabbits, which is the
second-best result. Going for the rabbits together gives every player
some rabbits, which is the third-best result. It is then best for both
hunters if each go for the stag. When the first hunter goes for rabbits,
it is better that the second hunter does not go for the rabbits, but
instead goes for the stag (and loses), thus enabling the first hunter to
hunt unimpeded. Consider the four levels of success, from 1 to 4:

In this manner, men may have insensibly acquired some gross ideas of mutual undertakings, and of the advantages of fulfilling them: that is, just so far as their present and
apparent interest was concerned: for they were perfect strangers to foresight, and were
so far from troubling themselves about the distant future, that they hardly thought of
the morrow. If a deer was to be taken, every one saw that, in order to succeed, he must
abide faithfully by his post: but if a hare happened to come within the reach of any one
of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple, and, having seized
his prey, cared very little, if by so doing he caused his companions to miss theirs.
See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on Inequality, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 209–10 (G. D. H. Cole, trans., 1923).
By using the table Game theory clarifies what the priority of each player is, and what is exactly
the set of options of each player has. However, we can see that Rousseau has advantage by
discussing the context: it is a game, in which the players do not think about their reputations,
they play as if they are strangers who do not think about tomorrow. This led Rousseau to propose the following recommendation:
It is easy to understand that such intercourse would not require a language much more
refined than that of rooks or monkeys, who associate together for much the same purpose. Inarticulate cries, plenty of gestures and some imitative sounds, must have been
for a long time the universal language; and by the addition, in every country, of some
conventional articulate sounds (of which, as I have already intimated, the first institution is not too easy to explain) particular languages were produced; but these were rude
and imperfect, and nearly such as are now to be found among some savage nations.
See id. at 210.
We propose to combine between the socially scientific approach of Rousseau and the preciseness of the table developed by game theoreticians.
8. Economists have noted this interesting result first. See Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 11, 32 (1956).
9. See Brian Skyrms, The Stag Hunt, 75 PROCS. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N 31, 31 (2001);
Robert Jervis, COOPERATION UNDER THE SECURITY DILEMMA, 30 WORLD. POL. 167, 167 (1978).
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Figure 2. Stag-hunt
Obviously, the absence of trust prevents achievement of the optimal
solution. However, if the players trust each other enough, they will
each achieve the optimal result. The important difference between the
prisoner’s dilemma and the stag-hunt does not lie in the stories, but
rather in the matrices.10 This is because it is possible to translate the
depiction of the stag-hunt game to the terms of the prisoner’s dilemma, without changing the stag-hunt conceptually. For example, if
the two suspects from the prisoner’s dilemma keep silent, they will
both walk. If they both sing, they will both receive the usual penalty.
But if only one sings, then only that one will receive a lenient penalty,
and the other will receive a heavy penalty.11
The most important difference between the prisoner’s dilemma and
the stag-hunt is this: in the prisoner’s dilemma, defection is the dominant strategy—each rational player will defect in any case—whereas
in the stag-hunt game, the defection (or its avoidance) depends on the
assessment of the players’ interdependent strategies. Whereas the
prisoner’s dilemma game offers no hope for cooperation, the stag
hunt game offers the option of raising the incentive for cooperation
through trust: if a player believes that the other will cooperate, the
player will cooperate. Moreover, if player X believes that the player Y
believes that X will cooperate, then the X will believe that Y plans to
cooperate, and hence the X will also cooperate. Hence, it is more important to avoid situations that impose the prisoner’s dilemma than
10. This may even be realistic, since in both options are available to the police, and they write
the rules, i.e., they choose what game that the prisoners will have to play, so it is reasonable that
the police will impose on them the prisoner’s dilemma game rather than the stag hunt game.
11. See Skyrms, supra note 9, at 32. They claimed:
The Stag Hunt does not have the same melodramatic quality as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It raises its own set of issues, which are at least as worthy of serious consideration. Let us focus, for the moment, on a two-person Stag Hunt for comparison to the
familiar two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . Suppose that hunting hare has an expected
payoff of 3, no matter what the other does. Hunting stag with another has an expected
payoff of 4. Hunting Stag alone is doomed to failure and has a payoff of zero. It is clear
that a pessimist, who always expects the worst, would hunt hare. But it is also true with
these payoffs that a cautious player, who was so uncertain that he thought the other
player was as likely to do one thing as another, would also hunt hare. That is not to say
that rational players could not coordinate on the stag hunt equilibrium that gives them
both better payoff, but it is to say that they need a measure of trust to do so.
Id.
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those that impose the stag-hunt game.12 This is a useful lesson for the
social sciences: some, but not all, cases of conflict allow for improvements all around, even while leaving the conflict as it is.
The difference between the variants of a game may be significant,
since small changes in the rules of the game can make all the difference. Because of this, the decision about which variant describes a
given political situation determines attitudes towards it, i.e., the decision of the political player which game they play will determine how
they will play the game: if they decide that they play a one-time prisoner’s dilemma, they will defect for sure . Thus, bellicose game theoreticians set the game one way, we contend, and the irenic ones set it
the other way.13 This is Mario Bunge’s14 criticism of game theory: it
encourages arbitrariness in scientific guise; one game theoretician may
describe the international interaction as one type of game, and another game theoretician will describe the same international interaction as another type of game. Descriptions of real-life situations as
games will be less arbitrary if they include options—whenever such
options are possible—for players to choose what game to play, with
whom, and with what payoffs. This decision as to what game to play,
this “super-game,” describes some situations better than the games
prescribed in standard game-theoretical texts. It is but our emphatic
recognition that at times some players can choose what game to
play–this is what standard game theory ignores and our Article wishes
to correct. The paradigm case should then raise the question: should
we start playing a “war game”?15
12. JOSEPH AGASSI & ABRAHAM MEIDAN, PHILOSOPHY FROM A SKEPTICAL PERSPECTIVE
94–96 (2008).
13. See MARIO BUNGE, SOCIAL SCIENCE UNDER DEBATE: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
176 (1998). We took his thesis one small step further.
14. Id.
15. Russel claimed:
Since the nuclear stalemate became apparent, the Governments of East and West have
adopted the policy which Mr. Dulles calls “brinkmanship”. This is a policy adapted
from a sport which, I am told, is practiced by some youthful degenerates. This sport is
called “Chicken!”. It is played by choosing a long straight road with a white line down
the middle and starting two very fast cars towards each other from opposite ends. Each
car is expected to keep the wheels of one side on the white line. As they approach each
other, mutual destruction becomes more and more imminent. If one of them swerves
from the white line before the other, the other, as he passes, shouts “Chicken!”, and the
one who has swerved becomes an object of contempt. As played by irresponsible boys,
this game is considered decadent and immoral, though only the lives of the players are
risked. But when the game is played by eminent statesmen, who risk not only their own
lives but those of many hundreds of millions of human beings, it is thought on both
sides that the statesmen on one side are displaying a high degree of wisdom and courage, and only the statesmen on the other side are reprehensible. This, of course, is
absurd. Both are to blame for playing such an incredibly dangerous game. The game
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1.1. The Repeated Version
A game is in a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to change
strategies unilaterally. Each player’s strategy is then the best response
for the strategy of the other.16 Nash17 limited his theory to games
without communication between players and only with unilateral
changes in the players’ strategies. Thus, when players in the (indefinitely repeated) prisoner’s dilemma adopt the strategy to always defect, neither has incentive to change strategy unilaterally. A friendly
bilateral change, such as tit-for-tat, would benefit every player,18 so
that by breaking the rule of unilateral change, they may come to an
agreement to alter their strategies simultaneously. One player’s hope
that his change of strategy will make the other follow suit should suffice as incentive to change strategies.
Consider the prisoner’s dilemma repeated indefinitely with a fixed
norm19 for cooperation and a fixed norm for defection. What conditions secure a Nash equilibrium in this game? Many Nash equilibria to
this game are available.20 The two standard pairs of strategies that
achieve the equilibria are mutual always-defect and mutual tit-fortat.21 In this game, the mutual always-cooperate strategy is not in a
Nash equilibrium22 because the choice of this strategy comprises inmay be played without misfortune a few times, but sooner or later it will come to be felt
that loss of face is more dreadful than nuclear annihilation. The moment will come
when neither side can face the derisive cry of “Chicken!” from the other side. When
that moment is come, the statesmen of both sides will plunge the world into
destruction.
BERTRAND RUSSELL, COMMON SENSE AND NUCLEAR WARFARE 19 (2001). The most important
proposal of Russel was that we should prevent this risky chicken game. (What Russel claimed
regarding one particular war game, should be claimed regarding other war games as well). The
conclusion from his proposal for game theoreticians should be to seek for ways to prevent risky
games, and this is the main correction that we propose to game theory, this is the right way to
make game theory.
16. John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286, 286 (1951).
17. Id.
18. See Kuhn, supra note 5.
19. Aumann and Dreze proposed: “Nash equilibrium is of central importance in studying
norms of strategic behavior[.]” See Robert J. Aumann & Jacques H. Dreze, Rational Expectations in Games, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 72, 80 (2008).
20. See Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
102 J. ECON. THEORY 84, 87 (2002).
21. The latter strategy invites the player to begin with cooperation, and to repeat in any other
round of the game what the other did in the previous round.
22. Game theory ignores the possibility that adopting the strategy of “always cooperate” may
change the preferences of the other player and by this change the game. This possibility is at the
heart of the famous novel Les Misérables by Victor Hugo. See generally VICTOR HUGO, LES
MISÉRABLES (1862).
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centive for opponents to always defect.23 Therefore, the mutual always-cooperate does not work in a game with fixed norms.24 Let us
emphasize: whereas mutual tit-for-tat strategies yield permanent mutual cooperation and are in a Nash equilibrium in this game, mutual
always cooperate do not. When players choose this strategy, the best
response of their opponents is to always defect! To encourage cooperation in this game, it is not sufficient that both players prefer mutual
cooperation.25 This is because it also depends on the following condition: each player should be ready to respond to defection with a sufficient degree of defection. If each player adopts, say, tit-for-tat, then
each player issues a threat to the other without ever realizing it. This
surprising insight has led prominent game theorists to a strange conclusion: the decision to punish opponents heavily enough, regardless
of the price of this decision, renders this very implementation (i.e., the
punishing) unnecessary.26
2. Against the vision of The Pax Romana
The Pax Romana relied on well-advertised cruel punishment for rebellion. What Robert Aumann27 said in his Nobel lecture regarding
the Cold War is also valid mutatis mutandis to the Pax Romana,
“[w]hat is maintaining the equilibrium in these games is the threat of
punishment. If you like, call it ‘MAD’ - mutually assured destruction,
23. The best result for a player in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma will be that the player will
always defect, and that the other will always cooperate. If the other adopts a strategy (i.e., a
complete plan of actions) of “always cooperate” regardless to what the player will do, then the
best response for this will be to play always cooperate. The strategy of “always cooperate” does
not provide any incentive to respond by minimal cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma.
24. Mutual always cooperate strategy is no Nash equilibrium since in this case every player
has incentive to defect: the literature deems always defect the best response to always cooperate.
We disagree; it is the best response only if players who adopt the always cooperate strategy do
not change their strategy when their opponents defect. The literature dismisses this criticism on
the strength of the observation that the last condition is fulfilled by definition: if the response to
defection is any strategy other than always cooperate, then it is not the always cooperate strategy. Our response to this is as follows. This observation hides a tacit assumption: the choice of a
strategy that each player makes is not open to replacement, since by definition every future
replacement of the chosen strategy is a part of it. This tacit assumption contradicts the theory of
Nash. He spoke of unilateral change of strategy. A change of strategy of a rational player depends not only on the opponent’s implementation of a plan, but also on the opponent’s change
of plan. In real-life, every plan is open to change, especially as learning from experience. A
rational player asks, does the way my opponent plays reflect a plan that is open for changes. This
is an open problem in (the allegedly fully determined) game theory. It may be on the agenda of
research in game theory.
25. See Robert J. Aumann, Game Engineering at 11 (The Federmann Ctr. For the Study of
Rationality, the Hebrew Univ., Discussion Paper Series, dp518, 2009).
26. Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 297 (1956).
27. Robert J. Aumann, War and peace, 103 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17075 (2006).
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the motto of the cold war.”28 Aumann’s lecture “War and Peace in the
Middle East” praised the vision of Pax Romana: Si vis pacem, para
bellum—if you want peace, prepare for war. We disagree. Assuming
the default option that a political situation is a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma (or any other games) is often a grave error. Rather than offering the best recommendations for players in a given game, in our
opinion, it is obviously better to advise them against games such as
prisoner’s dilemma (when it is possible) and to deliberate on the advisability of playing the game once the initial decision is made.
One way of changing the game is by changing preferences29: the
choice of humanist and peaceful values may prevent many risky
games.30 For example, the choice of liberal values may prevent a prisoner’s dilemma game between police and demonstrators. It is well
known that when liberalism prevents punishment, vigilantes find it intolerable.31 Yet, they are in error by their own light; their conduct
does not reduce crime. The same holds for the hostility to some types
of demonstrations, yet suppressing them notoriously incites violence.
This leads to absurd justifications for killing demonstrators.32 Some
game theorists would consider some games, such as repeated prisoner’s dilemma or the zero-sum game, sufficient justifications for real
28. Id. at 17077.
29. What distinguishes one game from another game is the matrix of payoff. The payoffs are a
function of the feeling of the players. Thus, when the feelings are changed, the player may play
an absolutely different game.
30. Russel emphasized that in order to prevent wars society should develop friendly feeling
and prevent hostile ones. Game theory can teach why he was right, and Russel can teach why the
influencing on preferences should be a part of the (super) game. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, WHY
MEN FIGHT 63–64 (1st ed. 2010).
31. Machiavelli claimed: “[I]f the populace be made the guardians of liberty, it is reasonable
to suppose that they will take more care of it . . .” See Father Leslie J. Walker, The Discourses of
Niccolò Machiavelli 220 (1992).
32. This was the claim of the Israeli general attorney before the Israeli high court discussing
the legality of shooting “central rioters”:
The starting point of the Respondents’ position is that these riots are taking place as
part of the ARMED CONFLICT existing between the Hamas terrorist organization and
Israel – and therefore the legal framework that regulates the opening of fire is the LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT. In this context, they distinguished between fire that is opened
and is regulated by the conduct of hostilities paradigm (for example, when the fire is
opened as part of actual combat between Hamas and Israel), and fire that is opened
and regulated by the law enforcement paradigm. The events which are the subject of
the petitions combine both . . . The Respondents further emphasized during the hearing
that the Rules of Engagement permit firing towards the legs of a central rioter or of a
central inciter, but are only carried out in the framework of the armed conflict that
exists between Israel and the residents of the Gaza Strip, and only as a last resort,
subject to strict requirements that derive from the principles of necessity and proportionality, and after all other means have been exhausted and failed.
See Judgment at 7–8, HCJ 3003/18 Yesh Din v. IDF Chief of General Staff (2019) (Isr.).
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actions. We instead recommend questioning the wisdom of the choice
to play any game, i.e., the players should choose which games to play,
and more importantly, which games not to play. It is obligatory to ask
whether the very decision to play a given game is legitimate. If it is,
then this should raise the question, is it wise to play?
Admittedly, a game in which unconditional cooperation comprises
incentive for the opponent to defect is problematic. For, obviously
most leading writers tacitly writerly admit, it renders the strategy of
unconditional cooperation inadvisable. Conditional generosity, we
claim, may very well be superior to it. In real life, where error is inevitable, Pax Romana is very risky. A mistake in reading the opponent’s
action may lead to war. Armament may lead to war in many other
international games, such as the stag-hunt, as it offer incentives for
increased aggressive conduct. The Romans did not consider this option, as they preferred always staying as ready for war as possible.33
The case of the prolonged tension between Israel and Palestine is similar: no side offers any proposal for peace negotiation, Israel prefers
the acquisition of territories to peace. Had Israel respected the right
of Palestinians to protest occupation, an agreement to end the present
tensions may be significantly more likely.
3. In Favor of The Vision of The European Union
Since the very consideration of waging war is expensive,34 it is wiser
to change the situation to enable players to rely on trust whenever
possible. This amounts to the transition from the prisoner’s dilemmatype game to the stag-hunt-type game. This happened in Europe after
World War II.35 Peace is now recognized as best for every memberstate of the European Union, even if an attack on a neighbor would
33. Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus claimed: “He who wants victory, let him train soldiers
diligently. He who wishes a successful outcome, let him fight with strategy, not at random. NO
ONE DARES CHALLENGE OR HARM ONE WHO HE REALIZES will win if he fights.” Publius Flavius
Vegetius Renatus, Vegetius: Epitome of Military Silence (N.P Milner trans., Liverpool University Press 2d ed. 2001).
34. See Michael Edelstein, What price cold war? Military spending and private investment in
the US, 1946–1979, 14 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 421, 421–22 (1990); RUSSELL, supra note 30, at
79–116.
35. This is how the European Union leaders celebrated their 2012 Nobel Prize in their Nobel
lecture:
Of course, peace might have come to Europe without the Union. Maybe. We will never
know. But it would never have been of the same quality. A lasting peace, not a frosty
cease-fire.
And to me, what makes it so special, is reconciliation . . .
To think of what France and Germany had gone through . . . and then take this step
. . . Signing a Treaty of Friendship . . . Each time I hear these words—Freundschaft,
Amitié— I am moved. They are private words, not for treaties between nations. But
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lead to an immediate surrender. In other words, the EU countries do
not play a game in which peace is based on the threat to respond by
aggressiveness to aggressiveness, and they do not play a game in
which the best result for a EU country is that they invade another EU
country and the other EU country will cooperate with them. This situation is obviously the best goal for all international relations, as it
achieves the most stability. In this situation, peace will be reasonably
stable, especially in positions of strength. This is quite intriguing because in other games, this optimistic assessment of the results of war is
what usually leads to wars: if both states believe that they will win the
war for sure without significant losses, it will be very hard for them to
come to peace, unless they prefer peace to war even when they are
sure that they will win the war without significant losses.36 Game theory, to repeat, does not account for the stability of the type of game
that would result in a Nash equilibrium of peace.37 The option of a
the will not to let history repeat itself, to do something radically new, was so strong that
new words had to be found.
...
But symbolic gestures alone cannot cement peace.
This is where the European Union’s “secret weapon” comes into play: an unrivalled
way of binding our interests so tightly that war becomes materially impossible. Through
constant negotiations, on ever more topics, between ever more countries. And it’s the
golden rule of Jean Monnet: “Mieux vaut se disputer autour d’une table que sur un
champ de bataille.” (“Better fight around a table than on a battle-field.”)
If I had to explain it to Alfred Nobel, I would say: not just a peace congress, a perpetual peace congress!
...
The Union has perfected the art of compromise. No drama . . . No drama of victory
or defeat, but ensuring all countries emerge victorious from talks. And for this, boring
politics is only a small price to pay . . .
See Herman Van Rompuy & José Manuel Durão Barroso, Nobel Lecture: From War to Peace: A
European Tale (Dec. 10, 2012).
36. Blainey claimed: “War is usually the outcome of a diplomatic crisis which cannot be solved
because both sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power.” See GEOFFREY
BLAINEY, THE CAUSES OF WAR 114 (3d ed. 1988); see also Branislav L. Slantchev & Ahmer
Tarar, Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 135, 146 (2011).
The authors claimed: “The mutual optimism explanation is perhaps one of the most venerated
explanations for how war can occur.” Id. We add: the choice of the game may prevent wars:
extreme optimism will lead to war when the parties play the game in which they wish to maximize their territories regardless to international law, but will not lead to a war in a game such as
the EU game, in which the countries do not prefer easy victory in war to peace.
37. Kohlberg and Mertens claimed:
The concept of equilibrium, as defined by Nash (1951), is central in the theory of noncooperative games. It reduces the set of all possible strategic choices by the players to a
much smaller set of those choices that are stable in the sense that no player can increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. One might be tempted to conclude that Nash equilibria must actually be “strategically stable” (self-enforcing) . . .
Since not all Nash equilibria are strategically stable, the natural question that arises is:
which ones are?
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peaceful stability was ignored when game theory was invented during
the Cold War.38
Nevertheless, one of the most important questions in political studies remains: how it is possible to prevent wars and arms races? Wars
and arm races may result from conditions for a game of prisoner’s
dilemma. Therefore, it may be wise to seek ways and means to prevent situations that invite playing this game, especially in international
relations. Considered mathematically, it is always advantageous to
add a neutral element to any set of objects39; in the case of game theory, we claim, the neutral element is the choice not to play.
The prevention of prisoner’s dilemma situations is possible. One example of this is legislating incentive for cooperation, including compliance with contracts. To do this in international relations is to grant
international courts the means to enforce their decisions.40 International institutions may generate repeated disincentives for aggression
and generate collective security mechanisms, including prizes for international cooperation and memberships in prestigious elite clubs
like the European Union. The European Union deters aggression
against any of its members by establishing a commitment to protect
every member from aggression.41 This is a generalization of the tradiSee Elon Kohlberg & Jean-Francois Mertens, On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, 54
ECONOMETRICA 1003, 1003 (1986). We are interested in a more primitive meaning of stability:
how much will the equilibrium be stable when the balance of powers, or the values, or the leaders are changed? In other words, we are interested in how much the (peaceful equilibrium) will
be stable when the game is changed. Thus, we are particularly interested in degrees of stability.
38. See John von Neumann: Life, Work, and Legacy, INST. FOR ADVANCED STUDY, https://
www.ias.edu/von-neumann (last visited June 11, 2021).
39. Peter M. Neumann, Galois and his Groups, NEWSLETTER (Eur. Mathematical Soc’y, Zurich, Switzerland) Dec. 2011, at 31–32, 34, 36.
40. Two urgent problems involve international courts. One concerns partial enforcement: the
court may not be able to bring war criminals to justice yet be able to prevent some states from
granting asylum to war criminals. The Arab Spring, and particularly the war in Syria, challenges
the institution of the International Criminal Court this way: some western states prevented the
compromise that gives immunity for the Syrian dictator Assad, without having the power to
bring him to justice or to deprive him from power. Second, establishing international courts with
enforcement mechanisms may amount to the imposition of a universal distrust between nations.
This is self-defeating, as is the intent to build an international institution that generates repeated
disincentives for aggression. And distrust may happen every time a new law has loopholes that
invite its violations with impunity. This is why we should be wary of new legislation, which is one
of the theses of Friedrich von Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty. FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK,
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 279 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 2011).
41. According to Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty:
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member
States.
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tional policy of seeking a balance of powers,42 since the threat to expel
an aggressor from an elite club, we claim, is a better means for
preventing aggression, especially internationally. The opportunity for
preventing international hostility encourages states to change the prisoner’s dilemma game into the stag-hunt game.
This discussion is obviously incomplete: it is limited to the prevention of war with a neighbor but does not address the need to prevent
war between neighbors. This is the need to devise disincentives for
aggression, such as the aggression of Italy against Ethiopia before
World War II, and of Iraq against Kuwait in August 1990. Besides this
disincentive, no means is available other than changing national preference—the preferences for peace-loving political leaders and political parties.43 This seems to be the most impressive achievement of the
European Union. Today, there is equilibrium within the European
Union where the preference is for peace over war.44
Another important question that this situation raises is: why is the
preference for peace not prevalent everywhere? Once we know the
answer to this, only then can we move to the next question: how can
peaceful countries transfer their preference for peace to others?
Moreover, we can ask, which of the two preferences is stronger, for
peace or for victory. The question is then the dislike of being considered “non-loyal,” “chicken,” “submissive,” “suckers,” etc., or hating
to be considered barbaric? When the situation is fluid, education promoting peace is most effective; otherwise, it is just similar to a Nash
equilibrium (but not quite, as it depends sensitively on other, more
delicate factors). A superficial impression suggests that education in-

Treaty on European Union art. 42(7), Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 39.
42. Paul Kirchhof, The Balance of Powers Between National and European Institutions, 5 EUR.
L.J. 225, 230–36 (1999). See generally HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY (1994).
43. Nicki Peter Petrikowski, Angela Merkel, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Angela-Merkel (last visited May 25, 2021).
44. Students new to prisoner’s dilemma often object: people do not like betraying friends. The
usual answer to this is that the standard description of a game takes account of the feelings of
players as a part of their systems of preferences. This reply is true, but facile. Indeed, mechanisms like love survived evolution not only because they help to achieve more in a particular
game, but also because they prevent some harmful games. Couples in love will be much less
prone to play the prisoner’s dilemma game than couples not in love. This does not impinge on
the game, but it does impinge on the choice of the game. More generally, only members of an
open society can choose with whom to play the game of marriage. Love reduces the frequency of
situations of prisoner’s dilemma games. Evolutionary scholars such as Dawkins, seek mechanisms that enable mutual cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. See generally
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976). However, seeking mechanisms that prevent occasions for this game is more efficient by far.
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creases pride in loving peace.45 If this impression is true, then peacelovers should help raise the educational level in their societies. This
amounts to the less obvious recommendation for economically advantaged countries to be generous and invest in the education of economically disadvantaged countries in order to preclude playing the
prisoner’s dilemma. Incentives for this recommendation are economic—peace is considerably cheaper than war46—and in line with
the preference for proper conduct or at least for appearance of proper
conduct. Similar to a low national crime rate, we claim, international
peace is a Nash equilibrium that is often desired without being easy to
achieve. Let us emphasize the parallel between national and international peaceful, law-abiding conduct.47
Game theory, obviously, cannot replace social science. In our opinion, it is possible and we recommend that it should, help decide which
policy to avoid in a particular game, and which policy to endorse. We
can use game theory in order to recommend which policy to adopt in a
particular game. However, in order to choose the right policy, we
should know who plays which game under what conditions. Such decisions are outside the province of game theory. Indeed the canonical
text on game theory of Von Neuman and Morgenstern opens with a
given game.48
Consider then the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.49
One part of it was the agreement of the United States to transfer a
large sum of funds to Egypt.50 The agreement still is a big success,51
although analysis of its effects depends52 on the future achievement of
peace in the region. Until then, the choice to enforce peace by the
45. Madhavi Majmudar, Human values, educating the Whole Child for peace and being a citizen in Multi-ethnic Britain, SATHYA SAI EDUC. IN HUM. VALUES (EHV), (May 22, 2002).
46. See Edelstein, supra note 34, at 421.
47. See Amrei Müller, Relationship between National and International Law, Public International Law, University of Oslo 14 (Oct. 14, 2013).
48. VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 3, at 48.
49. See generally Treaty of Peace, Egypt-Isr., Mar. 26, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115.
50. According to Clarke:
The unabashed political purposes of aid to Egypt were and remain: to reward Cairo for
making and maintaining peace with Israel; to build mass support within Egypt for the
peace treaty with Israel by using ESF, development assistance, and food aid to create a
link between peace and a more open, prosperous society; and to secure a strategic
relationship between Egypt and the United States.
See Duncan L. Clarke, US Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?, 51
MIDDLE EAST J. 200, 202 (1997).
51. Egypt affirms commitment to Israel peace treaty, JERUSALEM POST (Aug. 24, 2012, 9:17
AM), https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egypt-affirms-commitment-to-Israel-peace-treaty.
52. How to Deal with Threats: 4 Negotiation Tips for Managing Conflict at the Bargaining
Table, HARV. L. SCH. (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/conflict-resolution/
how-to-deal-with-threats/.
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threat to cut funds may still be a case of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Obviously, the obligation to enforce international treaties is
inferior to other mechanisms, such as threats to cease international aid
from economically advantaged countries, since war is very costly,
threats to respond with war may be dismissed.
By comparison, at least, the threat to stop generous support is much
more credible, since it is cheaper. Furthermore, since social norms
may block the prisoner’s dilemma game, we recommend the establishment of social international norms which prevent situations that may
invite playing the prisoner’s dilemma in international relations. Sometimes global public opinion may suffice for discouraging play of the
prisoner’s dilemma game.53 Leading game theoreticians often make
realist54 and aggressive recommendations in questions of war and
peace.55 They tend to belittle international agreements. Instead they
recommend frightening the opponent by making credible military
threats.56 They explicitly or implicitly adopt the Pax Romana’s cruel
vision.57 We examine options for applying game theory and come up
53. Woodrow Wilson claimed: “And in order to safeguard the popular power so far as we
could of this representative body, it is provided, you will notice, that when a subject is submitted,
not to arbitration, but to discussion by the Executive Council, it can upon the initiative of either
one of the parties to the dispute be drawn out of the Executive Council on the larger form of the
general Body of Delegates, because throughout this instrument we are depending primarily and
chiefly upon one great force, and this is the moral force of the public opinion of the world—the
cleansing and clarifying and compelling influences of publicity—so that intrigues can no longer
have their coverts, so that designs that are sinister can at any time be drawn into the open, so
that those things that are destroyed by the light may be properly destroyed by the overwhelming
light of the universal expression of condemnation of the world.” Woodrow Wilson, Address to
Peace Conference: Article XXVI (Feb. 14, 1919).
54. John Watkins claimed that game theory endorses Hobbes’ assertion that “covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.” See John Watkins,
Imperfect Rationality, in EXPLANATION IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 207 (Robert Borger &
Frank Cioffi eds., 1970). We argue that game theory should lead to the contrary conclusion, i.e.,
to the conclusion that covenants may prevent war even without sword waving, that game theory
refutes the Realpolitik approach. Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, Game Theory for International
Accords, 16 S.C. J. IN’L L. & BUS. 1, 13 (2020).
55. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 6 (1980); see generally Aumann,
supra note 27, at 5.
56. SCHELLING, supra note 55, at 36; Aumann, supra note 27, at 17076–77.
57. Robert Aumann said:
If Israel wants to live in peace with its neighbours, it’s actually doing everything wrong
from the point of view of game theory! A very large component of game theory is
about giving people incentives to do what you want them to do. So how does this work
with peace? Well, study the “world champions of peace,” Switzerland. The Swiss have
been at peace for close to 450 years. A year ago I was vacationing in Switzerland with
my grandson and saw military jet planes overhead. My grandson asked me: “Why do
the Swiss need fighter planes if they’ve been at peace for so long?” I responded that
that’s exactly why! They have peace because they are strong. The runners-up to the
Swiss are the Romans, who had a Pax Romana which lasted for about 230 years and
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with dramatically different recommendations: (1) we recommend the
building of international institutions that aim at the prevention of war;
(2) we argue that international agreements may, and at times do, prevent wars even when they are not enforceable; (3) we recommend
conditional generosity as a way to prevent wars and convince potential enemies that there is no intent to attack. The adoption of such
recommendations may turn hostility into friendship. Game theory is
not necessary to accomplish this. The Talmud says, “Who is the hero
of heroes? . . . One who can turn an enemy into his friend.”58 What we
find amazing is that game theoreticians who write books about peace
and war do not even raise the question of how it is possible to reduce
hostility by changing game preferences.59 We explain this as theoreticians’ adoption of the Pax Romana as their real-life model. Our real
example is the European Union. Hence, our present recommendation
is much more realistic than the recommendation of Aumann. We argue that there is no contradiction between goodwill and being strategically adept.60
One of our main recommendations then is to adopt conditional generosity instead of conditional aggression. As emphasized by Aumann,
mutual always-cooperate is not a Nash equilibrium in the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma and a player should not play always-cooperate in
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.61 These insights, however, are
not the end of the discussion but the opening of a new one. Even if the
member-states repeatedly play prisoner’s dilemma in real-life situations, it does not mean that a state should be aggressive. Thus, a state
can adopt conditional generosity instead of threats. This has many advantages: first, threats to withdraw generosity are more credible than
threats to declare war, since it is obviously substantially cheaper to
realize such threats than to realize threats of aggressiveness. Second,
adopting conditional generosity may lead the opponent to develop
peaceful preferences, while conditional aggressiveness may encourage
who had a maxim: “If you want peace, prepare for war.” Yet while Israel does prepare
for war, it’s not getting peace. That’s because while we may be preparing for war in
hardware – investing in the tools of war such as tanks, missiles, ground forces and
drones, we are failing to prepare for war in software – deep down in our hearts. To fully
follow the Roman axiom, a country has to feel deep down that it is ready to fight. But
our heart isn’t fully in it.
Yisrael Aumann, Israel70 — Yisrael Aumann on gaming Israel’s future, FATHOM (Mar. 2018),
https://fathomjournal.org/israel70-yisrael-aumann-on-gaming-israels-future/.
58. Babylonian Talmud, Avot d’Rabbi Natan 231:.
59. SCHELLING, supra note 55, at 4–5.
60. Although making credible threats is difficult for most people, showing goodwill is not.
61. Aumann, supra note 27, at 17076.
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aggressive preferences. Hence, conditional generosity can be an excellent substitute to war.
Our recommendation for conditional generosity follows John Maynard Keynes’ proposal in The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
If the General Election of December, 1918, had been fought on
lines of prudent generosity instead of imbecile greed, how much
better the financial prospect of Europe might now be . . . I believe
this to be an act of generosity for which Europe can fairly ask, provided Europe is making an honorable attempt in other directions,
not to continue war, economic or otherwise, but to achieve the economic reconstitution of the whole Continent.62

Later on, Keynes wrote,
Great Britain lives by commerce, and most Englishmen now need
but little persuading that she will gain more in honor, prestige, and
wealth by employing a prudent generosity to preserve the equilibrium of commerce and the well-being of Europe, than by attempting
to exact a hateful and crushing tribute, whether from her victorious
Allies or her defeated enemy.63

History proves him right.64 In game theory discourse about war and
peace, his proposal does not receive the attention it deserves.
4. Conditional Generosity versus Conditional Aggressiveness
Compare conditional aggressiveness with conditional generosity.
When conditional generosity is possible and responsible, its adoption
is more efficient means for promoting peace and security than threats,
since threats invite preparations. Mainstream game theory recommends conditional aggressiveness.65 Although this seems easier, because it is passive, conditional generosity is more practical as it is
much easier to implement and much more credible than threats of
violence.
Generosity is also more visible than a future use of force. Thus, it is
easier to dismiss conditional threats to use force than conditional
threats to withdraw generosity, particularly if the generosity is frequent. An additional advantage is the all-too-possible oversight of incentive for cooperation, which by its very meaning inevitably may lead
to war. As a deterrent then, the threat of aggression is more dangerous than threats to cease generosity. For, the undesired but possible
response to it poses a bigger threat to peace.
62.
63.
64.
65.

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 102, 164 (1920).
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A REVISION OF THE TREATY 193–94 (1922).
Actually, Marshall plan is a (too) late adoption of Keynes’ program.
SCHELLING, supra note 55, at 187.
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Another advantage of generosity is granting your opponent the
right to enjoy the benefit of the doubt. Jonathan Bendor ran a tournament of a variant of repeated prisoner’s dilemma with noise66: they
allowed for a small likelihood that one party would mistakenly read
the conduct of the other, resulting in the adoption of the strategy to
cooperate or to defect.67 If the game is long, at times this will happen.68 In the tournament, the strategy that was generous won, while
tit-for-tat received eighth place.69 The generous strategy was to cooperate fully unless the other one displayed a level of cooperation below
the standard, and then to reduce the level of cooperation accordingly.
This strategy allows the opponent to enjoy the benefit of the doubt.70
Since there is noise, this strategy has the advantage of not falling into
the cycle of revenge, which is the risk incurred when the tit-for-tat
strategy is adopted. The Talmud offers a similar solution to the problem of how to prevent noise from leading to a cycle of revenge:
“[j]udge every person favorably.”71 Maimonides explained,
A person’s character is unknown to you and you are not aware
whether he is righteous or wicked. You saw that he performed a
deed or made a statement that, according to a given set of circumstances, could be considered good, but could also be considered
bad. Judge the person favorably, and do not think ill of him72.

In accordance with game theory, this is not only moral; it may promote self-interest akin to the case of the tournament run by Bendor.73
This is an alternative to Pax Romana and a preferable one at that.
The generous strategy that Bendor discusses differs from our preferred strategy. Bendor’s perspective on generosity was to not punish
the other side if you are unsure of their lack of cooperation.74 Given
that you may always make mistakes, Bendor also believed that punishing them should only be done if they repeat their uncooperative
behavior under a sufficient degree of certainty that they really did it.75
By contrast, we spoke about generosity in the sense of giving the other
66. In the standard version of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma there is no option of mistakes,
mainly the parties know what the other player did, there is no “noise” of mistakes in reading
what the other player did.
67. Jonathan Bendor et al., When in Doubt. . . Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma, 35
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 700–01 (1991).
68. See generally id.
69. Id. at 696.
70. Id. at 696–97.
71. The Interpretation of the Maimonides 1:6.
72. Id.
73. Bendor et al., supra note 67, at 691.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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more than they are entitled to, and, in cases where generosity is conditional, incentivizing the other without punishing them. Those two
kinds of generosity contribute more than deemed obligatory. The Talmud says, “R. Johanan taught, ‘Jerusalem was destroyed because its
inhabitants judged according to the law.’ Should they rather have
judged made arbitrarily? No; they judged strictly in accord with the
law, instead of acting generously.”76This is the counsel to avoid any
insistence on one’s rights. Game theory may present this insistence as
a good strategy; nevertheless, quite often generosity (rather than honesty) is the best policy.
5. A Game-Theoretical View of Brexit
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European
Union (EU), is known as the Brexit. It was a shock to both the European union and even to Britain, since it was unexcepted even in Britain.77 The Brexit displays a major difference between games of crisis
in old Europe and those in new Europe: unlike the old shaping of
Europe by war and threats of war, new Europe is shaped by negotiation and by threats to limit cooperation.78 This is the advantage of the
EU model over the Pax Romana. The wish to leave the Roman Empire led to war; the wish to quit the EU exclusive club may make it
offer a new agreement.79 The EU is an exclusive club that does not
impose membership but provides positive incentives for being a mem76. Babylon Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b.
77. Steven Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down, NY. TIMES
(June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-europeanunion-referendum.html.
78. According to Schuman Declaration:
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up
of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of
Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to
the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially
impossible. The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing
to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic
elements of industrial production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their
economic unification. This production will be offered to the world as a whole without
distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to
promoting peaceful achievements.
Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, Declaration to French Foreign Ministry (May 9,
1950).
79. See Valentin Kreilinger et al., Brexit: Negotiation Phases and Scenarios of a Drama in
Three Acts (Jacques Delors Inst., Policy Paper No. 182, 2017); Ursula F. Ott & Pervez N. Ghauri,
Brexit negotiations: From negotiation space to agreement zones, 50 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 137, 139
(2019).
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ber-state80. Thus, the EU is much less vulnerable when tribal feeling,
i.e., strong feeling of affiliation plus willingness to make sacrifices,81
leads a country to quit the club. It is democracy that improves the
capacities to interact with separatist groups.82 The logic of the Pax
Romana cannot deter groups that adopt the strategy of freedom-ordeath and thus it encourages bloodshed. Because Pax Romana cannot
deter groups from clinging to the freedom-or-death strategy, those
countries are forced to yield or fight a total war.83 The Romans would
play a total war with those who adopt the freedom-or-death strategy,
whereas the EU would play the game of divorce with them. For, no
party in this interaction will withdraw unless their goal will be absolutely met. To me Pax Romana strategy is clearly unreasonable when
the other side can also adopt it. The liberal will not say: “if you wish to
fight, let’s fight, when he has an option to leave the club without fighting.” The capacity to compromise, particularly, is one of the greatest
advantages of the liberal over the aggressive. The liberal chooses to
lose what is not worth fighting for, whereas for the aggressive, losing is
not an option.
80. According to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union:
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its
own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union
shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements
for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the
Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of
the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of
the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member
State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of
the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the
discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union.
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be
subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
Treaty on European Union art. 50, Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 43–44.
81. Regarding tibial feeling, see KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 25 (1st
ed. 2002).
82. Id.
83. Paul K. Saint-Amour, On the Partiality of Total War, 40 CRITICAL INQUIRY 420, 425
(2014).
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6. Conclusion
The considerations above may make some players switch from Pax
Romana to the European Union game, as error is inevitable and Pax
Romana is risky since a mistake in reading an opponent’s action may
lead to undesired war. Since the very consideration of waging war is
expensive, it is wiser to change the situation in order to enable players
to rely on stable trust whenever possible. Stable trust, then, is obviously the best goal for international relations. It renders peace reasonable, especially for those in positions of strength. This is quite
intriguing, since most other types of war games do not preclude the
major cause of war, namely, the over-optimistic assessments of the
result of waging a war. The Romans response to the freedom-or-death
strategy, as it happened in Judea, is the strategy of managing a total
war. The EU, however, would prefer playing the game of divorce. This
is one of the greatest advantages of the liberal over the aggressive.
The liberal chooses to lose what is not worth fighting for, whereas for
the aggressive, losing is not an option.

